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When vigilantes turn bad: Gangs, violence, 
and social change in urban Nicaragua 




On 12 February 2002, I returned for the first time in almost five years to barrio 
Luis Fanor Hernández,1 a poor neighbourhood in Managua, the capital city of Nicaragua, 
where I had previously carried out research on youth gang violence.2 I was revisiting in 
order to “update” my original study, a process that I have to admit I conceived less as a 
“realist” cataloguing of social change than as a “constructivist reconstruction” of my 
initial interpretations, to use the terminology of Burawoy’s theory of “reflexive 
ethnography”.3 Following Nicaragua from afar, little seemed to have changed since my 
initial study, and I thought that my revisit would therefore mainly involve rethinking the 
processes I had uncovered previously from new theoretical viewpoints. This rather naïve 
notion was completely shattered on my first day back in the barrio when I met Ronnie, 
who as a nine year old member of the local gang had been an important informant in 
1996-97. He greeted me with an enthusiastic “Oye, Dennis, what’s up?”, and followed this 
up with a rapid-fire patter of questions:  
 “How are you, hombre, where have you been, it’s been a while since we’ve seen you 
around here. What’s new, you look like you’ve really changed… ¡Te pusiste gordo, maje! 
(You’ve become fat, mate!).” 
 “Hi Ronnie, nice to see you too!”, I answered. “I’m doing OK, sorry it took me so long 
to come back, all sorts of things have happened, my life’s completely different now. But 
hey, you’ve changed as well, man! You were just a kid last time I was here and look at you 
now – you’re so big! What are you now, 14, 15, no? How are you doing? What are you up 
to? Are you still a pandillero (gang member)?” 
 “Nah, I’m no longer with the pandilla (gang), all that’s changed, maje. So much has 
changed here – you won’t recognise the barrio (neighbourhood), I tell you. The gang’s not 
the same as when you were here, it’s got a different onda (ethos) now and no longer looks 
after the neighbourhood any more but does its own thing instead. …The whole barrio is 
                                                 
1 This name is a pseudonym, as are all the names mentioned in this chapter. 
2 See Rodgers (2000). This first period of fieldwork was carried out between July 1996 and July 1997. The 
second period described in this chapter was conducted between February and March 2002 as part of the 
London School of Economics Crisis States Programme (see http://www.crisisstates.com). 
3 See Burawoy (2003). 
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completely different to when you were here before, Dennis. Everything’s fucked up now, 
especially the gang, which has turned bad…” 
It came as a surprise to hear that Ronnie was no longer a gang member, as he was 
not yet of an age to have “matured out” of the youth gang, as inevitably happened to all 
members at some point between the ages of 18 and 23 years old (youth not being an 
eternal condition). At the same time, my prior research had shown that pandillero 
trajectories are difficult to predict, and several 14-15 year olds had left the gang during 
my fieldwork in 1996-97. It was, however, a complete shock to hear that the gang had 
“turned bad”, as Ronnie put it. The main finding of my previous research had been that 
contrary to received wisdom, the pandilla had provided a significant measure of stability 
and order to the local neighbourhood in a wider Nicaraguan context of crisis, insecurity, 
and state and social breakdown. I could see no reason why the gang might have “turned 
bad” considering the country’s continuing dismal predicament, but it rapidly became 
clear that Ronnie was not wrong in his assessment of the pandilla’s changed dynamics, to 
the extent that during the course of my revisit I sometimes felt as if I was re-investigating 
a completely different phenomenon. 
This chapter explores how and why Nicaraguan pandillerismo (youth gangsterism) 
changed so radically between 1997 and 2002. It begins by tracing the major differences 
between the 1996-97 manifestation of the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang that I 
initially studied on the one hand, and its 2002 avatar on the other, highlighting in 
particular the divergences relating to the gang’s violent social practices and attitudes 
towards the local neighbourhood community. Drawing on the theoretical lens of 
vigilantism, it characterises the variation between the two manifestations of the barrio 
Luis Fanor Hernández gang as resulting from the inherent “lability” of vigilante practices, 
and considers what this tells us about the nature of the gang’s evolution, but also what it 
does not tell us. It then explores the actual details of the process of the gang’s 
transformation between 1997 and 2002 in order to properly understand this “lability”, 
before concluding with certain general considerations about processes of institutional 
change. 
Pandillerismo in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, 1997-2002 
In 1996-97, the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla was made up of about 100 
male youths aged between 7 and 22 years old, who engaged in a variety of violent 
activities ranging from petty delinquency to gang warfare. These all complied with a 
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cardinal “golden rule”, however, which was not to prey on local neighbourhood 
inhabitants. The victims of the local gang were always outsiders, and gang members in 
fact went out of their way to protect local neighbourhood inhabitants from outside 
criminals and pandilleros. Even what at first glance seemed to be an unmitigatedly 
destructive form of pandilla violence, gang warfare, was arguably fundamentally socially 
constitutive. Conflicts followed set behavioural rules – attacking certain opposing gang 
members rather than others, defending local neighbourhood inhabitants, fighting in 
particular ways – that played important roles in the construction of the individual gang 
member self, for example. Gang wars also contributed to the constitution of the gang as 
a group, reaffirming the collective unit by emphasizing the primordial distinction 
between “us” and “them”. But gang warfare was arguably also about a broader form of 
social construction that related to the local community. Indeed, the pandilleros qualified 
their wars as being motivated by their “love” for the neighbourhood, portraying their 
fighting of other gangs as “acts of love”.4 As a gang member called Julio put it:  
“You show the neighbourhood that you love it by putting yourself in danger for people, 
by protecting them from other pandillas… You look after the neighbourhood; you help 
them, keep them safe…” 
This is by no means implausible. Gang warfare was semi-ritualised, and followed 
set patterns. The first battle of a pandilla war involved fighting with sticks, stones, and 
bare hands, but each new battle involved an escalation of weaponry, first to knives and 
broken bottles, then mortars, and eventually to guns, AK-47s, and fragmentation 
grenades. Although the rate of escalation could vary, its sequence never did and pandillas 
did not begin their wars immediately with firearms. This ritualised escalation arguably 
constituted both a restraining mechanism – escalation is a positive constitutive process in 
which each stage calls for a greater but definite intensity of action and is therefore always 
under the actors’ control – and an “early warning system” for local neighbourhood 
inhabitants. Although gang wars often had negative consequences for the local 
community – people were sometimes caught in the cross-fire of gang wars, and 
infrastructural damage was common – these were arguably indirect insofar as gangs never 
directly victimised the local population of their own neighbourhood. The threat to local 
neighbourhood populations stemmed from other gangs, whom the local gang would 
engage within a prescribed manner, thereby limiting “the all-pervading unpredictability of 
                                                 
4 Parallels can be made with the “love for the people” that Ernesto “Che” Guevara (1969: 398) saw as 
being the mark of “the true revolutionary”. This is perhaps particularly appropriate considering the strong 
associations that exist between Sandinismo and the “Cult of Che” (see Lancaster, 1988: 132 & 185). 
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violence”,5 and locally creating a predictable and relative “safe haven” in its own 
neighbourhood. 
In a context of chronic insecurity, this function was arguably socially positive, 
and certainly local neighbourhood inhabitants very much recognised it as such, never 
calling the police during gang wars, nor ever denouncing gang members.6 Although there 
was some ambivalence towards the gang phenomenon – the parents of gang members 
frequently worried about their offspring, and would often publicly berate their pandillero 
sons – there was no fear of the local gang in the neighbourhood, and it was generally 
viewed positively. As Don Sergio put it during an interview in 1997: 
“The pandilla looks after the neighbourhood and screws others; it protects us and allows 
us to feel a little bit safer, to live our lives a little bit more easily... Gangs are not a good 
thing, and it’s their fault that we have to live with all this insecurity, but that’s a problem 
of pandillerismo in general, not of our gang here in the barrio. They protect us, help us – 
without them, things would be much worse for us.” 
This view of the gang stemmed not only from the fact that the pandilla was the 
purveyor of security but also because it was the only social form in the neighbourhood 
that displayed any sort of “community spirit”. Indeed, the gang’s violent “care” for the 
barrio stood in sharp contrast to the wider atomisation and social breakdown, and 
arguably provided the only concrete institutional medium through which an otherwise 
absent form of “communitas”7 was enacted in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández. 
Neighbourhood inhabitants who otherwise shunned each other – to avoid entangling 
themselves into webs of reciprocal obligations – would avidly seek each other out to 
swap stories about the gang, exchanging eye-witness accounts, spreading rumours, and 
re-telling incidents, thereby converting the pandilla into the primary symbolic index of 
community, in a manner that bears comparison with Bloch’s classic description of the 
development of a “communal aesthetic pleasure” among the Merina and Zafimaniry of 
Madagascar as a result of local youth violence.8
It became rapidly apparent on my return to barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in 2002 
that the gang had changed radically compared to 1996-97, however. It was now made up 
of just 18 youths aged 17 to 23 years old. Although all had belonged to the gang in 1996-
97, the gang’s practices and attitudes had evolved. Gang warfare had disappeared, levels 
of intra-neighbourhood gang-related violence had increased, and the gang was now 
                                                 
5 See Arendt (1969: 5). 
6 At the same time, the Police were not a visible presence in the neighbourhood in 1996-97, partly because 
gangs out-gunned them, which obviously made patrolling and control difficult (see Nicaragua Network 
News, 2001). 
7 See Turner (1969). 
8 Bloch (1996: 216). 
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intimately connected to a thriving local crack cocaine-based drug economy.9 The 
pandilleros were now a threatening presence, no longer imbued with an ethos of “loving” 
the barrio, as a pandillero called Roger made clear: 
“We couldn’t give a fuck about the barrio inhabitants anymore… If they get attacked, if 
they’re robbed, if they have problems, who cares? We don’t lift a finger to help them 
anymore, we just laugh instead, hell, we even applaud those who are robbing them… 
Why should we do anything for them? Now we just hang out in the streets, smoke crack, 
and rob, and nothing else!” 
This was very visibly partly related to crack consumption. Although drug 
consumption had been widespread within the gang in 1996-97, the main drug consumed 
at the time had been marijuana, which has very different neurological and psychiatric 
effects to crack. Crack makes users extremely violent, as a gang member called Chucki 
emphasised: 
“This drug, crack, it makes you really violent, I tell you… when I smoke up and 
somebody insults me, I immediately want to kill them, to get a machete and do them in, 
to defend myself… I don’t stop and think, talk to them, ask them why or whatever… I 
don’t even recognise them, all I want to do is kill them… it’s the drug, I tell you, that’s 
where the violence comes from…” 
There were very obviously many more acts of spontaneous, unpredictable public violence 
occurring in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in 2002 compared to 1996-97, and the majority 
could be linked to crack consumption. Furthermore, most incidents seemed to involve 
gang members. Although they were by no means the only crack users in the 
neighbourhood, the gang clearly constituted a privileged site of crack consumption, and 
all the pandilleros were crack addicts. Consequently, it was extremely common to see 
drugged pandilleros stopping local inhabitants in the streets and asking for money for 
another fix. If ignored or refused, they would almost invariably lash out. 
At the same time, although crack consumption was an important factor behind 
this changed behaviour pattern and consequent rise in insecurity, to a larger extent this 
was arguably the result of the gang’s intimate association with drug trafficking. Cocaine 
began to be traded in the barrio around mid-1999, initially on a small-scale by just one 
individual but rapidly expanding into a three-tiered pyramidal drug economy by mid-
2000. At the top of the pyramid was the “narco” who brought cocaine into the 
neighbourhood. The narco wholesaled his goods to, among others, half a dozen “púsheres” 
(sic) in the neighbourhood. Púsheres re-sold this cocaine in smaller quantities or converted 
it into crack which they sold from their houses, mainly to a regular clientele which 
                                                 
9 Although cocaine and crack were available in Managua in the mid-1990s, they were not widespread and 
only became prevalent from 1999 onwards. For a detailed explanation of the growth of the cocaine trade in 
Nicaragua see Rodgers (2004). 
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included the “muleros”, who were the bottom rung of the drug dealing pyramid, selling 
sold small doses of crack to all-comers on barrio street corners. There were 19 muleros in 
barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, 16 of whom were pandilleros.10 The rewards of such small-
scale dealing were substantial: an individual mulero could make US$350-600 per month, 
equivalent to three to five times the average Nicaraguan wage. At the same time, 
although gang member muleros conducted their drug dealing transactions individually, the 
gang as a group acted to ensure the proper functioning and protection of the barrio drug 
economy in general, providing security services to the narco and to púsheres, and making 
certain that transactions proceeded smoothly. Pandilleros would enforce contracts, 
roughing up recalcitrant clients if the narco or púsheres asked them to, as well as guarding 
drug shipments as they moved both within and outside the barrio. 
The gang would also make sure that clients could enter the neighbourhood 
unmolested by either the local population or outsiders, and the ritualised wars of the past 
with other gangs had completely disappeared as a result, presumably because they would 
have made it difficult for potential clients to come safely into the barrio, and were 
therefore detrimental to the gang’s changed drug dealing preoccupations. Violent 
confrontations with other gangs did still occur, but in a different way. For example, in 
early 2001 a group of muleros from the nearby barrio Nosara gang occupied one of the 
entrances to barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in order to intercept crack clients. When they 
realised what had happened, the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla attacked them with 
guns and shot two dead and left three critically injured. The gang had furthermore also 
instituted a veritable regime of terror at the level of the neighbourhood. Pandilleros would 
strut about the streets, menacingly displaying guns and machetes, and verbal warn barrio 
inhabitants of potential retribution should they denounce them or others involved in the 
local drugs trade.11 They would moreover frequently back these threats with acts of 
arbitrary violence as Doña Yolanda described:  
                                                 
10 All of the various actors of the drugs trade were in fact linked to the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla 
in one way or another. The narco was an ex-gang member from the early 1990s and all the púsheres were 
either ex-pandilleros from the mid-1990s or else closely related to ex-pandilleros, and the three non-pandillero 
muleros were former gang members. 
11 Although there were more police patrols in the neighbourhood than five years previously, these were 
clearly token in nature, and tended simply to drive down one street of the barrio, turn around, and drive 
back up a parallel street – generally past the muleros on their street corners. There were sporadic police raids 
on barrio púsheres – although never on the narco – but these tended to turn up little of suspicion, as the púsher 
would have generally received a tip-off from a corrupt policeman (as one told me after being raided). When 
the police did, occasionally, find evidence, it only affected reputedly ambitious púsheres who were potential 
rivals to the narco, which supported the consensus in the barrio that the police had been “bought” by the 
narco and that he used them to get rid of his enemies. It seems likely that the narco may have been reluctant 
to use the pandilleros for this purpose due to their close links with the púsheres, who were all ex-pandilleros. 
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“Five years ago, you could trust the pandilleros, but not anymore… They’ve become 
corrupted due to this drug crack… They threaten and attack people from the barrio now, 
rob them of whatever they have, whoever they are… They never did that before… They 
used to protect us, look out for us, but now they don’t care, they only look out for 
themselves, for their illegal business (‘bisnes’)… People are scared, you’ve got to be careful 
what you say or what you do, because otherwise they’ll attack you… Even if you say 
nothing, they might still come and rob you, come into your home, steal a chair, food, 
some clothes, whatever they can find… They often do, you know it’s them, but you can’t 
blame them, otherwise they’ll come and burn your house down… It’s their way of telling 
you to be careful... If you say anything to them, if you do anything, if you denounce 
them, then they’ll come at night and wreak their vengeance... We live in terror here in the 
barrio, you have to be scared or else you’re sure to be sorry... It’s not like it used to be 
when you were here last time, Dennis, when the pandilleros were kids we could be proud 
of because of what they did for us and for the barrio… They’re like strangers to us now, 
they just do things for themselves and never for the good of the community like 
before…” 
Mutatis mutandis: Gangs, violence, and vigilantism 
I have argued elsewhere that pandillas and their violence can clearly be seen as 
primary forms of social structuration in contemporary urban Nicaragua, rather than the 
unmitigated source of chaos and disorder that they are generally perceived to be.12 In 
particular, I contend that they can be conceived as examples of “social sovereignty” that 
organically establish localised but variable regimes of political order within the wider 
conditions of social and state breakdown, constrained economic circumstances, 
insecurity and uncertainty that characterise post-revolutionary Nicaraguan society. This is 
something that came out particularly strongly in interviews I conducted with ex-
pandilleros. Although gangs in Nicaragua can be traced back to the 1940s, by all accounts 
they were small-scale and relatively innocuous youth aggregations until the early 1990s, 
when their numbers increased massively and they became significantly violent. This 
development was clearly linked to the end of the civil war which affected Nicaragua for 
much of the 1980s, as many of the new gang members were 16 to 20 year old youths, 
freshly demobilised from the Sandinista Popular Army or the Contra forces. Gang 
members from this period whom I interviewed all mentioned that becoming pandilleros 
had seemed a natural continuation of their previous roles as conscripts or guerrillas, that 
is to say as “defenders of the Nation” or as “freedom fighters”. The early 1990s were 
highly uncertain times in Nicaragua, as “social conflicts …reached a new level of barely 
restrained anarchy”,13 partly due to a widespread process of “state disintegration”.14 Ex-
pandilleros recalled feeling a sense of responsibility for their friends, families, and local 
                                                 
12 See Rodgers (2006). 
13 Lancaster (1992: 293). 
14 See Isbester (1996). 
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communities in the face of this insecurity, and joining or constituting a gang had been a 
means of “serving” and “protecting” these more effectively than doing so individually. 
To this extent, a parallel can clearly be made with notions of vigilantism, which 
Abrahams has classically described as including a range of violent social practices that 
emerge from the efforts of communities “to make sense of their lives and maintain some 
sort of order in their world”, particularly “in ‘frontier’ zones where the state is viewed as 
ineffective or corrupt”.15 Indeed, the association between youth gangsterism and 
vigilantism is not new. Suttles, for example, famously analysed gangs in inner city 
Chicago neighbourhoods as “vigilante peer groups” policing and defending “warrior 
societies” in the face of “the failure of …public institutions”.16 Although Abrahams 
cautions against assimilating “autonomous ‘informal sector’ groupings” such as gangs 
with vigilantism, on the grounds that the former tend to break “first- rather than second-
order legal rules”,17 this is in many ways a moot point in contexts where legal rules to all 
intents and purposes hardly apply. Indeed, this is something that Abrahams implicitly 
recognises when he discusses the way vigilantism “occupies an awkward borderland 
between law and illegality”,18 insofar as it is formally illegal but informally accepted. As a 
result, vigilante practices are frequently legitimised through “commonsense” notions of 
“decent, independent, law-abiding citizens, anxious to live and work in peace, and ready 
to defend their right to do so if the state fails them”,19 despite the fact that they do not 
actually have any formal right to do so.20
Ultimately, both gangs and vigilantism can be characterised as highly ambivalent 
social phenomena. At the same time, however, this ambivalence arguably derives less 
from the fact that they emerge in a legal twilight zone, but more because of the fact that 
they are “rather labile …manifestations [that] are relatively short-lived, and …always 
capable of slipping and sliding in one direction or another”.21 This “lability” means that 
social practices such as vigilantism or Nicaraguan pandillerismo that might at first glance 
seem in some way normatively positive – insofar as they create order in contexts of chaos 
– have the potential to rapidly become socially negative. This is something that is 
                                                 
15 Abrahams (1998: 3 & 9). 
16 Suttles (1972: 191). 
17 Abrahams (1998: 163). 
18 Abrahams (1998: 7). 
19 Abrahams (1998: 3). 
20 The discourse that emerged in the mid-1990s justifying the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang’s violent 
activities as “acts of love” for the neighbourhood arguably similarly provided the institution of pandillerismo 
with a localised legitimacy, as was evidenced by Don Sergio’s 1997 testimony, as well as Doña Yolanda’s 
remark five years later that “the pandilleros were kids we could be proud of because of what they did for us 
and for the barrio”. 
21 Abrahams (1998: 7). 
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particularly well illustrated by the evolutionary trajectory of the barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández pandilla between 1997 and 2002, whereby it mutated from being a vigilante-
style social form that promoted a solidaristic sense of local community in the face of 
wider processes of social breakdown – something that could plausibly be spun as 
normatively positive – to a more exclusive and predatory institution focused on 
promoting a limited form of capital accumulation based on the exploitative control of a 
particular resource – something more difficult to support and justify in social terms. 
At the same time, though, while thinking about the transformation of pandillerismo 
in terms of changes in the institution’s normative form and function makes a good deal 
of sense, it arguably tells us little about the specific processes through which change 
occurs. As Cohen has pointed out, this is important insofar as it is necessary to go 
beyond simply describing either the function or the form of an institution in order to 
properly understand it, particularly when considering this institution over time.22 
Although there is obviously a relationship between form and function, neither form nor 
function are inherent to any given institution, and neither continuity nor change in either 
necessarily entails continuity or change in the other, since different forms can achieve a 
specific function, while conversely, a particular form can fulfil different functions. From 
this perspective, in order to really understand the implications of the “lability” of 
Nicaraguan vigilante gangs, it is important not only to have a picture of what is common 
and what is different between the two manifestations of the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández 
pandilla described above, but also to have a sense of the actual process of transformation 
it underwent, as it is this that will provide us with a real understanding of how and why 
Nicaraguan pandillerismo changed. 
Tracing the transformation of the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández 
pandilla 
 It would be tempting to link the differences between the barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández pandilla in 1997 and 2002 to crack cocaine. Certainly, this is what Ronnie 
intimated during our conversation on the first day of my return to the neighbourhood. 
When pressed as to why the gang had “turned bad” he suggested: 
 “Because of all sorts of shit, maje, because of all sorts of shit… But most of all because 
of la droga (drugs)…” 
 “Drugs? What do you mean, marijuana?” 
                                                 
22 Cohen (1969: 219). 
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 “No, of course not, maje, that stuff’s nitua (cool), you know what it’s like, there’s nothing 
harmful about marijuana. No, maje, what I’m talking about is la piedra (the stone), crack 
cocaine. Marijuana is nothing compared to that shit, I tell you. Crack’s changed 
everything…” 
At the same time, the emergence of drugs only goes so far in explaining why pandillerismo 
in Nicaragua underwent such a wholesale transformation, particularly when one 
considers that all the testimonies I gathered in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández tended to 
suggest that the gang was already in the process of changing when cocaine made its 
appearance in the neighbourhood in 1999. 
Indeed, the gang’s mutation seems to have begun as early as the end of 1997. The 
barrio Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla had until then been divided into distinct age and 
geographical subgroups: there were three age cohorts – the 7 to 12 years olds, the 13 to 
17 years olds, and those 18 years old and over – and three geographical subgroups, 
respectively associated with the central area of the neighbourhood, the “abajo” (or West) 
side of the neighbourhood, and the “arriba” (or East) side of the neighbourhood. The 
different geographical subgroups had distinct names, respectively “los de la Calle Ocho” 
(named after the alleyway where this group tended to congregate), “los Cancheros” 
(because of a “cancha”, or playing field – if only in name, because all it was in fact was a 
stretch of relatively un-potholed road – on that side of the barrio) and “los Dragones” 
(because all its members had a dragon tattoo). These different subgroups generally 
operated separately, except in the context of gang warfare, when they would come 
together in order to defend the neighbourhood or attack another. At the same time, even 
if the different groups were very autonomous, the individual gang members always 
presented themselves as members of a generic barrio Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla, and 
none of the subgroups, whether determined by age or geography, ever fought each other, 
although fights did occasionally break out between individuals. 
Around November 1997, the Calle Ocho pandilla subgroup fell apart because its 
entire elder age cohort “matured out” of the gang simultaneously. This seems to have 
been precipitated by the departure from the neighbourhood of a prominent member of 
that age cohort a few months previously and the sudden death of another. The younger 
members of the subgroup were absorbed into the two other barrio pandilla subgroups and 
the Calle Ocho subgroup ceased to exist. This polarisation of the gang into two subgroups 
had important consequences for the gang’s internal dynamics. The tripartite structure of 
the gang had constituted a stable system, with each subgroup effectively holding the 
others in a balance of power. Binary structures, however, are inherently oppositional, and 
by all accounts there rapidly developed a strong sense of rivalry between the two 
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remaining subgroups. This was reflected in the development of a heightened sense of 
subgroup territoriality that culminated in areas of the barrio dominated by one group 
becoming no-go areas for the other and vice-versa, something that was unprecedented 
compared to past internal barrio Luis Fanor Hernández gang dynamics. 
Tension was further heightened towards the end of 1998 when the Cancheros 
subgroup changed its name to “Los Killers”, because members of the subgroup were 
involved in a series of murders. Around Easter 1999, this tension erupted into a full-
fledged conflict between the Killers and the Dragones subgroups. Ronnie, who had then 
been a member of the Dragones, explained the situation in the following way: 
“The conflict was inevitable. They [the Killers] believed they were the masters, you 
understand. They believed they were better than us. But here, in the pandilla, everybody’s 
equal, you can’t have a situation where some are better than others, we’re all equal, you 
understand, nobody is better than anybody else. In the pandillero language, we say that 
they were shitting bigger than their arses (‘se la tiraban aquí del culo’), that they were getting 
too big for their boots. They were trying to put one up on us, which wasn’t right, you 
understand, and so we had to make them respect us, to make them understand … We 
had to make them respect what we call the law of ice (‘la ley del hielo’). What this means is 
that when somebody tries to put one up on you, if they try to dominate you, then you 
have to give it to them, you’ve got to hit them, slash them, beat them up real good, you 
know, smash their head against the wall until they’re covered in blood, defeated, dead, 
perhaps, at any rate so that they’ll never defy you again. That’s what you have to do to 
make them respect the law of ice, as we say here in Nicaragua, so that’s why the conflict 
between us was inevitable.” 
The inevitable conflict was sparked off when a family with four youths belonging 
to the Killers moved from the West side of the barrio, which was the Killers’ side, to the 
East side, the Dragones’ side. The Dragones wanted nothing to do with the four Killers 
pandilleros, but at the same time gave them an ultimatum to either leave the Killers or leave 
their side of the barrio. Refusing the Dragones’ demands, the Killers decided to take pre-
emptive action and attack the Dragones by surprise one evening. This was unprecedented 
behaviour insofar as it was the first time a barrio Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla subgroup 
attacked another. The Dragones had – fortuitously for them – been planning a surprise 
attack on a neighbouring pandilla later that night and so had their weapons at hand, and 
the fight quickly escalated into a raging gun battle that had little in the way of the 
customary ritualised nature of gang warfare. The gang subgroups fought each other for 
several hours, causing widespread damage to barrio houses and almost one hundred 
neighbourhood inhabitants were injured, although somewhat miraculously there were no 
deaths. The Dragones eventually acquired the upper hand and went on a rampage, hunting 
down and beating up Killers gang members – in one gruesome case cutting the ear off one 
(while the pandillero’s father lost an eye trying to intervene) – and systematically attacking 
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the houses on the Killers’ side of the barrio, including burning several down with Molotov 
cocktails. 
According to both pandilleros and non-pandilleros, this conflagration was “too 
much” for the barrio population. Several families called the Police and denounced the 
pandilleros. Six Dragones members were arrested with the active cooperation of 
neighbourhood inhabitants, while another half dozen fled the barrio. When the case 
against the six who had been caught was due to come to court, however, those Dragones 
gang members that remained in the neighbourhood threatened the barrio inhabitants who 
were pressing charges with reprisals, and the case was quickly dropped. This 
unprecedented episode profoundly marked the barrio pandilleros and fundamentally 
changed their attitude towards the neighbourhood population. As a Dragones pandillero 
called Roger put it:  
“The people in the barrio showed themselves to be hypocrites then, all of a sudden they 
hated us, and they turned against us, but before that we had been respected, liked, 
because we helped and protected them… without us they couldn’t survive! Now they 
don’t want to know about anything, they’ll fucking denounce us if they get half a chance! 
Why should we do anything for such treacherous people (‘gente trucha’)?” 
The Dragones began to wander about the barrio visibly armed partly in order to 
intimidate the barrio population, but also the Killers, who spontaneously disaggregated in 
the face of this terrorisation. At the same time, however, the Dragones rapidly reduced in 
size from some forty members just after the conflict with the Killers to twenty members 
by the beginning of 2001.23 To a certain extent, demographic factors came into play, as 
the peak of pandillero recruitment in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández seems to have been 
reached in 1995-96, and many of those who joined the pandilla then had been 14-15 years 
old, and were consequently reaching an age at which “maturing out” naturally came into 
play. Another factor was that in early 2000 the municipal authorities built two basketball 
courts in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, which – more incidentally than by design – 
provided an alternative focal point to the pandilla for neighbourhood youth, and in 
particular for those wavering over membership.24 More generally, though, the conflict 
with the Killers and its aftermath also profoundly affected Dragones pandilleros, as one called 
Elvis, who had had to flee the barrio in order to avoid being caught by the police after the 
Dragones-Killers conflict, makes clear: 
                                                 
23 Two of the twenty subsequently died due to drug consumption-related health complications. The 
eighteen remaining were the eighteen that made up the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández pandilla in 2002. 
24 This should in no way be seen as signalling an increased state presence in the barrio, as the basketball 
courts were the first public works to be carried out since the Sandinista regime’s urban reconstruction 
efforts in the early 1980s, and were linked to the Liberal Party’s (failed) municipal re-election campaign. 
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“It was horrible, I was running from here to there, millions of places, from one to the 
other to avoid being caught, and it’s horrible, I tell you… You feel like you’re being 
tracked, hunted, like an animal, always looking over your shoulder… I never want to be 
on the run again, so ever since all that, I’ve looked to distance myself, to avoid problems, 
especially as those guys in the pandilla have got crazier and crazier, you know, more 
violent and all… I began spending less time with the pandilla, doing my own thing, not 
looking for trouble. I still talk with everybody and all, but when there’s going to be 
trouble, I do my own thing, you know, to avoid problems…” 
It was at this point that the emergence of crack cocaine had a significant impact 
on the gang in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández. Crack consumption by gang members began 
before those who remained became centrally involved in drug dealing from early 2000 
onwards, but both accelerated the transformation of the gang in a variety of ways. Both 
crack consumption and dealing led to a reduction in the number of youths involved by 
creating impediments for younger gang members – in particular those under 13 years old 
– insofar as they are both activities that are physiologically less suited for the young. The 
health effects of smoking crack are particularly deleterious on children, and dealing can 
be a problematic activity for them due to clients’ lack of confidence, as well as their 
inability effectively to protect themselves from potentially violent addict clients. Some 
gang members also simply did not take to crack cocaine, as an ex-Dragones pandillero called 
Kalia told me: 
“I left the gang when everybody started smoking crack, because it really fucks you up. 
Everybody started doing it as soon as the narco started selling it, and then it got heavier 
and heavier as the pandilla got involved in the drug dealing, so there was no way of 
staying in the gang and not doing that shit.” 
The gang’s involvement in the emergent drugs trade also completely changed other 
patterns of behaviour, for example leading to the rapid abandonment of ritualised gang 
warfare with neighbouring pandillas, as this was an activity that could potentially scare 
crack clients away. The gang’s ever-more parochial interests also crystallised gang 
members’ already negative attitudes towards the local neighbourhood population, and 
this ever-increasing antagonism vis-à-vis the barrio also contributed to gang members 
dropping out, as Ronnie told me: 
“I became independent [sic] because I didn’t like the gang’s hatred towards the barrio… 
You know how we used to love this neighbourhood, Dennis, you remember, no? That’s 
why I was in the pandilla, because I loved the barrio – we’d protect it, take care of it, 
people would appreciate it… When everything fell apart and people in the barrio and also 
the guys in the gang began to act like shits towards each other, I just said fuck it, that’s 
not my thing, and left.” 
The gang members that remained established themselves as muleros in the local 
drugs economy. This was of course hardly fortuitous. A drug economy cannot rely on 
classic mechanisms of regulation and contract-enforcement – such as the law – in a 
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context where drugs are illicit, and inevitably needs alternative mechanisms to impose 
regularity onto transactions. As numerous theorists have pointed out, the most basic 
means of social regulation is violence, and as the dominant manifestation of brutality in 
the neighbourhood, the gang was ideally positioned to supply this violence.25 At the same 
time, the exclusive nature of the drugs trade meant that to be able to provide this 
violence coherently the gang needed to be a small, self-interested unit rather than a large, 
communitarian group. Indeed, the solidaristic nature of pandillerismo in the mid-1990s 
might very well have precluded the pandilla from becoming involved in the drugs trade 
had cocaine appeared then, because gang members would most likely have been 
unwilling to direct their violence against neighbourhood inhabitants. When the drugs 
trade emerged and consolidated during 1999-2000, however, the barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández gang was undergoing a number of endogenous changes that were leading to 
an organisational shakedown of the gang and an inversion of its previously solidarity with 
the local community that meant that it was more amenable to offering the services 
required by the drugs trade, and also to grasping the opportunities provided by the 
appearance of cocaine at that particular point in time. 
Conclusion: Understanding social change 
As Bardhan has remarked, “an institution’s mere function of serving the interests 
of potential beneficiaries is clearly inadequate in explaining it, just as it is an incompetent 
detective who tries to explain a murder mystery only by looking for the beneficiary and, 
on that basis alone, proceeds to arrest the heir of the murdered rich man”.26 There always 
exists at any given time a “repertory” of possible collective actions at the disposal of 
social actors, and the ones they chose and how these evolve are the result of a 
conjunction of factors that cannot necessarily be predicted in a deterministic manner.27 
Rather, as Douglas has pointed out, institutional arrangements tend to emerge through a 
process of “bricolage”,28 the result of ad hoc combinations of pre-existing social forms 
and processes. It is therefore not the relationship between a given institutional form and 
function per se that is important, but rather understanding what it is that enables a given 
institution to articulate a given function, what the limitations are on this particular 
                                                 
25 Furthermore, as an ex-gang member, the narco was ideally connected to the gang in order to involve 
them. 
26 Bardhan (1989: 1392, italics in original). 
27 See de Certeau (1984). 
28 Douglas (1987: 66). 
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institution performing this particular function, and what the different factors are that can 
lead to a change either in form or function or both. 
The emergence of the drugs trade in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández during mid-
1999 clearly stands out as an important factor in explaining the profound transformation 
that the neighbourhood pandilla underwent between 1996-97 and 2002. At the same time, 
however, endogenous changes affecting the pandilla before the rise of drug dealing were 
clearly also just as critical, not only in terms of understanding the specific trajectory of 
the gang, but also for comprehending the actual development of the drugs trade in the 
neighbourhood. Without the gang’s changing internal dynamics it is likely that the drugs 
trade would not have been able to take root in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández when it did. 
At the same time, there also existed something of a positive feedback loop between the 
two social processes that mutually transformed and consolidated their evolution, to the 
extent that we can talk of a real “compatibility” between pandillerismo and the drugs trade. 
Without this “compatibility”, both the drugs trade and the gang’s transformation from a 
communitarian social form to a more predatory institution would have been impossible, 
as it was in many ways this more than anything else that enabled them to flourish and 
mutually reinforce each other. 
Seen in this way, it can be argued that it is not so much particular endogenous or 
exogenous factors such as the internal dynamics of gangs or the drugs trade that are 
important in order to explain the “lability” of Nicaraguan pandillerismo, but rather the fact 
that these issues came together in a particular manner at a particular moment in time. To 
this extent, it is perhaps more accurate to talk about the existence of a “contingent 
compatibility”, insofar as the transformational trajectory of any given institution through 
time is to a large extent not so much determined as contingent, an improvisation from a 
range of possibilities. What is important to understand, then, is what determines the array 
of options and their potential articulation at any given point in time, and while the 
emergence of exogenous factors or the endogenous contradictions of institutions are 
important to explaining social change, they do not constitute by themselves the basis 
upon which to explain the “lability” of given institutions. Rather, we need to have a more 
holistic idea of the complex interplay between exogenous stimuli, endogenous 
contradictions, and the particular nature of an institution, its context, and the agency of 
the social actors involved, as is starkly highlighted by the way the vigilante gang of barrio 
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